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Abstract—Information and Communication Technologies
(ICT) are one of the underpinning platforms of smart grids,
facilitating efficient grid management and operation, optimiza-
tion of resource utilization, as well as enable new products,
features, and services. However, this interconnection of grid
technology with ICT leads to various security challenges in
the power grid. One such concern is the tampering of usage
data from smart meters which may result not only in incorrect
billing, but also in incorrect decisions related to demand and
supply management. In addition to network based cyber attacks,
smart meters are also susceptible to physical attacks since they
are installed in customer premises without hardware protection
mechanisms. In this paper, we propose a novel privacy-aware
authenticated key agreement scheme which can not only ensure
secure communication between the smart meters and the service
provider, but also the physical security of smart meters. In this
regard, we utilize the lightweight cryptographic primitives such
as Physically Uncloneable Functions (PUFs) and one-way hash
function, etc. Hence, the proposed scheme is suitable even for the
resource constrained smart meters.
Index Terms—Privacy-aware, Mutual authentication, Physi-
cally uncloneable functions, Fuzzy extractor, Smart grids.
I. INTRODUCTION
Worldwide demand for electric energy is expected to rise
82 percent by 2030 [1]. This demand will primarily be met by
building many new coal and natural gas electricity generation
plants. Not surprisingly, global greenhouse gas emissions
are estimated to rise 59 percent by 2030 as a result. New
technology and stricter policies will transform energy industry
as “phenomenal” growth in solar and wind power contin-
ues. To minimize the need for additional generators, power
grids use demand-response management to improve energy
efficiency and reduce overall electricity consumption. In this
regard, smart grids have emerged as a promising technology to
manage the many different forms of renewable energy sources
that will be connected to the power grid in the future, from
multitudes of household solar panels to vast offshore wind
farms. Smart grids are gaining popularity in both academia
and industry because of the increased grid reliability and other
potential benefits that they offers to the customers. In general,
smart grids use advanced Information and Communication
Technologies for two-way communication between end users
and utility service providers. ICT can be viewed as an essential
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enabler of smart grids for offering a reliable and cost-effective
demand-response management between the customers and the
service provider.
Although the integration with ICT offers several benefits
in smart girds, it also leads to various security and privacy
challenges. For instance, to maintain proper balance between
demand and generation of energy, both the customers and
the utility service providers need to exchange information.
However, an adversary can tamper with or capture this flow
of information, which may bring about an imbalance between
demand and supply. In addition, the captured information can
expose personal information that may be used for targeted ad-
vertisements and/or criminal activities. For instance, long-time
analysis of the consumers’ data can reveal private information
related to their daily routines. On the other hand, in order to
cheat in billing, an inside attacker in a home or business may
try to change the configuration of a smart meter and subject
it to physical attacks. Moreover, without hardware protection
mechanisms in smart meters, an adversary can obtain secret
information (e.g. cryptographic keys) by basic side channel
and invasive attacks.
A. Related Work
In recent years, several authentication schemes have been
proposed for smart grid environments. Wu et al. proposed
a authentication and key distribution scheme for smart grids
using elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) [2]. However, Xia et
al. pointed out that the scheme presented in [2] is vulnerable to
man-in-the-middle attacks and they introduced a new scheme
[3]. Subsequently, Park et al. showed that Xia et al.’s scheme
cannot ensure security against impersonation attacks [4]. In
addition, it also cannot ensure the anonymity of the smart
meters. Hereafter, in 2016, Tsai et al. introduced an identity-
based signature scheme for smart grids [5]. However, Odelu et
al. proved that this scheme cannot provide session key security
and also fails to provide strong credentials privacy of the
smart meter [6]. Hereafter, few more interesting authentication
schemes have been proposed in recent years [7-10]. However,
as in [2-6], most of these schemes are based on computation-
ally expensive public-key cryptography which is impractical
for the resource constrained smart meters. Furthermore, none
of the above existing works has considered the physical secu-
rity of smart meters, which is greatly important for resisting
inside attackers (e.g. a home user) from compromising and
controling smart meters for their own profit. Some existing
literature has discussed the importance of PUFs in Advance
Metering Infrastructure (AMI) [26-28]. However, they do not
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Table I
SYMBOLS AND CRYPTOGRAPHIC FUNCTION
Symbol Definition
SIDSMi Shadow identity of SMi
CRP(C , R) Challenge-Response pair
sk Session key (SMi -service provider)
PUFSMi Physically uncloneable functions of SMi
h(·) One-way hash function
⊕ Exclusive-OR operation
FE Fuzzy extractor
|| Concatenation operation
consider the privacy issues in AMI and the noise issues in
PUF design, which are greatly important for ensuring secure
smart grid communication. Finally, we note that network
anonymization systems like Tor may also be used to provide
user privacy [29]. However, these anonymity systems are
known to be vulnerable to malicious relay nodes. Besides,
most of these systems are based on public-key cryptosystems.
Hence, they are ill-suited for resource constraints smart meters.
B. Our Contribution
This paper seeks to address all the above issues by propos-
ing an anonymous authenticated key agreement scheme for
secure communication in smart grids using computationally
inexpensive primitives based on PUFs [15-16]. The key con-
tributions of this paper can be summarized as follows:
• A novel privacy-preserving authentication protocol using
PUFs, which can provide several key security properties
including resilience against man-in-the-middle attacks,
resilience against DoS attacks, and forward secrecy,
which are all requirements for secure smart grid commu-
nication. One of notable features of the proposed scheme
is that it does not require any secret key to be stored on
the smart meter but it still can ensure the desired level of
security.
• Elimination of noise in the PUF response from the
resource constrained PUF-enabled smart meters by using
the concept of fuzzy extractors.
• A formal security analysis using sequence of games.
• A comparative study of the proposed scheme with closely
related existing schemes. It is shown that the proposed
scheme is secure and computationally efficient, and re-
quires significantly lower overhead for establishing a ses-
sion key between a smart meter and the service provider,
as compared to the related existing schemes.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II
we provide a brief introduction to PUFs and fuzzy extractors.
In Section III we present the proposed privacy-aware authen-
ticated key agreement scheme for smart grids. Security of the
proposed scheme is analyzed in Section IV. A performance
analysis is provided in Section V with concluding remarks in
Section VI. The symbols and cryptographic functions of the
proposed scheme are defined in Table I.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Fuzzy Extractor
A (d, λ, ) fuzzy extractor is composed with two algo-
rithms: FE.Gen and FE.Rec [11-13]. FE.Gen is a prob-
abilistic key generation algorithm, which takes a bit string
R as input and outputs a key K and helper data hd , i.e.,
(K, hd) = FE.Gen(R). On the other hand, FE.Rec is a
deterministic reconstruction algorithm that recovers the key K
from the noisy input variable R′ and the helper data hd , i.e.,
K = FE.Rec(R
′
, hd), if the hamming distance between R′
and R is at most d. A fuzzy extractor (FE) ensures security in
the extraction of a strong cryptographic key if the min-entropy
of the input R is at least λ, and K is statistically -close
to an uniformly distributed random variable in {0, 1}k. Since
repeated exposure of the helper data may result in additional
min-entropy loss [14],[17], the helper data should not be
exposed during the execution of the authentication protocol.
A (d, λ, ) fuzzy extractor is said to be secure if the following
condition holds:
1. Pr[K = FE.Rec(R
′
, hd)|(K, hd) ← FE.Gen(R),
HD(R,R
′
) ≤ d] = 1, where HD represents the hamming
distance.
2. If the min-entropy H˜∞(R) ≥ λ, then (K, hd) ←
FE .Gen(R) is statistically -close to (K
′
, hd), where K
′ ←
{0, 1}|K|.
B. Physically Uncloneable Function
In this subsection, we provide a brief description of PUFs.
A PUF is characterized by a challenge-response pair (CRP).
It is an integrated circuit (IC) which takes a string of bits as
an input challenge and produces a string of bits called the
response. The response R of a PUF PUF to a challenge C
can be represented as follows: R = PUF (C). A PUF exploits
the uniqueness of the physical micro-structure of the IC that
is created during the manufacturing process to ensure that no
two PUFs are the same. As the PUF output depends on the
physical characteristics of the IC, any attempt to tamper with
the PUF changes its behavior and renders the PUF useless.
Due to this unique property, PUFs have gained popularity
as an important paradigm for physical security of resource
constrained devices. However, the noise in a PUF’s output
that results from environmental conditions (e.g. temperature)
is still a limiting factor in PUF design, and may result in one
or more of the output bits of the PUF being incorrect for any
challenge. To address this issue, the concept of fuzzy extractor
has been introduced. A (d, n, l, λ, )-secure PUF needs to hold
the following requirements:
1) For any two PUFs PUF1 (·) and PUF2 (·), and for any
input C1 ∈ {0, 1}k, Pr[HD(PUF1 (C1),PUF2 (C1)) >
d] ≥ 1− ε.
2) For any PUF PUFi(·) and for any input C1, · · · , Cn ∈
{0, 1}k, Pr[HD(PUFi(C1),PUFi(C2)) > d] ≥ 1− ε.
3) For any two PUFs PUFi(·) and PUFi∗(·),
and for any inputs C1, · · · , Cn ∈ {0, 1}k,
Pr[Hˆ∞(PUFi(Ck ),PUFi∗(Cj ))1≤j ,k≤n,i 6=i∗,j 6=k >
λ] ≥ 1 − ε. This condition denotes that during the
evaluation of different PUFs using multiple inputs, the
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Figure 1. Setup phase of the proposed privacy-aware authenticated key agreement scheme.
min-entropy of the PUF outputs must be larger than λ
with high probability [23], when the intra-distance, i.e.,
the distance between two PUF responses from the same
PUF instance and using the same challenge is smaller
than d, and the inter-distance, i.e., the distance between
two PUF responses from different PUF instances using
the same challenge, is greater than d.
C. Pseudorandom Functions
A pseudorandom function PRF:{0, 1}k×{0, 1}∗→{0, 1}k ′
which takes a secret security parameter K {0, 1}k and a
message M {0, 1}∗ as input and provides an arbitrary string
PRF(K , M) which is indistinguishable from random string.
Now, assuming that h be a polynomial-time computable
pseudorandom function. For distinguishing h, a probabilistic
polynomial-time (PPT) adversary A may request polynomial
bounded queries with its selected inputs and obtain the outputs
computed by h for training. After the training phase, A
is given a function, which is either h or a truly random
function. We say that h is a pseudo-random function, if it
is indistinguishable from a truly random function under A
. Namely, A is given either h or a truly random function
according to a random bit {0, 1} and it has only the probability
1
2 + ε, to distinguish h.
III. PROPOSED SCHEME
In this section, we present the proposed anonymous au-
thenticated key agreement scheme for secure communication
in smart grid systems. The proposed scheme consists of two
phases: setup phase and authentication phase.
A. Setup Phase
During meter installation, the utility service provider first
randomly generates a challenge C and also a set of synchro-
nization challenges Csyn = {c1, c2, · · · , cn} which are later
used to address any desynchronization between the service
provider and the smart meter. Hereafter, the service provider
sends {C,Csyn} to smart meter SMi through a secure channel.
Then, the smart meter extracts the PUF outputs {R,Rsyn}
by using the unique embedded physical function PUFSMi
and sends {IDSMi , R,Rsyn} to the service provider, where
IDSMi is the identity of SMi , through the secure channel.
Then, the service provider randomly generates a shadow
identity SIDSMi and a set of unlinkable fake identities FID =
{fid1 , · · · ,fidn}, and calculates (K,hd) = FE.Gen(R) and
(Ksyn , hdsyn) = FE.Gen(Rsyn). After that, the service
provider sends {SIDSMi ,FID, (C, hd), (Csyn , hdsyn)} to the
smart meter through the secure channel. Finally, the service
provider stores {SIDSMi ,FID, (C, hd), (Csyn , hdsyn)} for fur-
ther communication with smart meter SMi . Details of this
phase are depicted in Figure 1.
B. Authentication Phase
The authentication phase of the proposed scheme consists
of the following steps:
Step 1: Smart meter SMi selects its shadow identity SIDSMi
from its memory and generates a random number ns and
subsequently sends {SIDSMi , ns} to the service provider.
Step 2: Upon receiving the authentication request, the
service provider first locates SIDSMi in its database and reads
(C,K). Next, the service provider generates a random number
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Figure 2. Proposed privacy-aware authenticated key agreement scheme.
np and calculates n∗p = K ⊕ np and a key-hash response
V0 = h(ns||K||n∗p). It then composes a response message
M2 : {C, n∗p, V0} and sends it to SMi .
Step 3: After receiving the response message M2, SMi
first extracts the PUF response R
′
= PUFSMi (C) and selects
the helper data hd from its memory and computes K =
FE.Rec(R
′
, hd) for reconstructing the key K. After that, SMi
computes and checks the key-hash response parameter V0. If
the verification is successful, SMi calculates np = K ⊕ n∗p,
Cnew = h(np||K), R′new = PUFSMi (Cnew ), R∗new = K ⊕
R
′
new , and the key-hash response V1 = h(np||K||R∗new). It
then composes a message M3 : {R∗new , V1} and sends it to
the service provider.
Step 4: Upon receiving message M3, the service provider
first checks whether the key-hash response parameter V1 is
valid or not. If so, then the service provider calculates R
′
new =
K ⊕ R∗new , (Knew , hdnew ) = FE.Gen(R
′
new ), Cnew =
h(np||K), hd∗new = h(np||K) ⊕ hdnew , V2 = h(hd∗new ||K),
SIDnewSMi = h(SIDSMi ||K), and sk = h(np||ns||K) and
composes a message M4 : {hd∗new , V2} and sends it to SMi .
Step 5: After receiving message M4, smart meter SMi first
computes and validates V2. If the validation is successful,
then SMi calculates hdnew = h(np ||K) ⊕ hd∗new , SIDnewSMi =
h(SIDSMi ||K), and the session key sk = h(np||ns||K).
In this way, both SMi and the service provider establish
a session key for their secure communication. Next, SMi
updates its memory with {SIDnewSMi , (Cnew , hdnew )} for the
next interaction with the service provider.
Note that if any step of the above validation process is
unsuccessful, both SMi and the service provider will abort the
execution of the protocol. In case of loss of synchronization
between smart meter SMi and the service provider (which
can be detected if SMi does not get any response from the
service provider or if the service provider cannot recognize
SMi ), SMi selects one of the unused fake identities (say
fidj ) from FID = {fid1 , · · · ,fidn}. It then sends fidj and a
random number ns to the service provider. On receiving this
message, the service provider selects one of the unused pairs
of (cj , kj) ∈ (Csyn ,Ksyn) and sends cj to SMi . Then, SMi
locates hdj in its memory and uses its PUF and FE.Rec to
obtain the keying element kj . At the end of the authentication
process, SMi deletes {fidj , (cj , hdj)} from its memory, and
similarly the service provider deletes {fidj , (cj , kj)} from
its database. It should be also noted that in the proposed
authentication scheme, SMi is allowed to use almost x FID
and (Csyn ,Ksyn) pairs, where x < n − 1. After that, SMi
needs to request the service provider for a new set of FIDs
and (Csyn ,Ksyn) pairs. In this regard, SMi needs to send
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its (x + 1)-th fake identity along with a random number
ns and a “Re-Load” message in the authentication request
M1. On seeing the “Re-Load” indication in M1, and after
the authentication and key-establishment process, the service
provider will use the session key sk to provide the new set
of FIDs and (Csyn , hdsyn) pairs to SMi . In this way, we can
address the issue of desynchronization or DOS attacks without
compromising the privacy of smart meter SMi and without
executing the setup phase on a regular interval. Details of this
phase are shown in Figure 2.
IV. SECURITY MODEL AND ANALYSIS
This section first describes the theoretical security and
privacy model used for evaluating our proposed scheme. Then
we use these models to analyze the security and privacy of
the proposed scheme.
A. Security Model
Consider a set of smart meters M = {M1,M2, · · · ,Mn}
that interact with the service provider S. S initially executes
Setup(1k ) and produces a public parameter pp and a shared
secret parameter sp. Here, pp denotes all the available public
parameters (crypto suites) of the environment (e.g., PUF out-
put length, coding mode, pseudo-random function (PRF) algo-
rithm name, etc.) and sp represents the secret PUF responses.
In this setup phase, S communicates with the smart meters
in a secure environment and transfers the security credentials
to start the authentication process. During the execution of
the authentication phase, these parties interact through an
insecure network and mutually authenticate each other. At the
end, the parties output 1 (acceptance) or 0 (rejection) as the
authentication result. The communication sequence between
the parties is called a session and each session is distinguished
by its session identifier, denoted by sid. We say that a session
has a matching session if the messages exchanged between
S and members of M are honestly transferred. For the
correctness of the proposed scheme, it is imperative that if
a session has a matching session, then both the smart meter
and service provider always accept the session.
In this section, we consider security against the man-in-the-
middle attack, which is the canonical security level for any
authentication protocol. In this regard, the ability of an attacker
is modeled by letting the attacker to control all the communica-
tion between a smart meter and the service provider. Here, the
attacker is allowed to modify messages between a smart meter
and the service provider. The authentication outputs for both
parties becomes 1 if and only if the communication messages
are honestly transferred. In addition to the canonical security
requirement for the man-in-the-middle attack, in our model we
allow the adversary to obtain the memory contents in the non-
volatile memory before and after the session (authentication).
Now we consider a security game, denoted by ExpSecΠ,A(k),
between a challenger C and adversary A against an authenti-
cation protocol Π.
ExpSecΠ,A(k):
1) (pp, sp)Random←−−−−−−Setup(1k );
2) (sid∗,Mj)Random←−−−−−−A
Launch,SendS ,SendM,Result,Reveal
1 (pp,
S,M);
3) b := Result(sid∗,Mj );
4) Output: b.
At the end of the setup phase, A can interact with the smart
meter and the service provider and obtain various information
by issuing the following oracle queries:
– Launch(1k ): Launch a service provider unit S to begin a
new session with security parameter k.
– SendS : Send a random message m to S.
– SendM(Mj ,m): Send arbitrary message m to the meter
Mj ∈M.
– Result(P, sid): Output whether the session sid of P is
accepted or not, where P ∈ {S,M}.
– Reveal(Mj): Output the entire information contained in
the memory of the meter Mj .
The advantage of the adversary A against the protocol Π,
denoted by AdvSecΠ,A(k), is defined as the probability that the
game ExpSecΠ,A(k) outputs 1 when sid
∗ of P has no matching
session.
Definition 1: An authentication protocol Π is said to be
secure against man-in-the-middle attacks with key compro-
mise if for any probabilistic polynomial time adversary A,
AdvSecΠ,A(k) is negligible, i.e., Adv
Sec
Π,A(k) ≤  in k (for large
enough k).
B. Privacy Model
Now we consider indistinguishability-based privacy. In this
case, the adversary randomly picks two smart meters and tries
to distinguish the communication derived from any one of the
two meters. The privacy experiment between the challenger
and the adversary A := (A1,A2,A3) is then described as
follows:
ExpIND∗−bΠ,A (k):
1) (M ∗0 ,M
∗
1 , st1)Random←−−−−−−A
Launch,SendS ,SendM,Result,Reveal
1
(pp, S,M);
2) bU←−{0, 1}, M
′
:=M{M∗0 ,M∗1 };
3) Π0Random←−−−−−−Execute(S ,M ∗0 ),
Π1Random←−−−−−−Execute(S ,M ∗1 ),
st2Random←−−−−−−A
Launch,SendS ,SendM,Result,Reveal
2 (S,M
′
,
I(M∗b ),Π0,Π1, st1);
4) Π
′
0Random←−−−−−−Execute(S ,M ∗0 ),
Π
′
1Random←−−−−−−Execute(S ,M ∗1 );
5) b
′
Random←−−−−−−A
Launch,SendS ,SendM,Result,Reveal
3 (S,M,Π
′
0,
Π
′
1, st1)
6) Output b
′
.
At the end of the setup phase, the adversary A1 issues the
oracle queries and sends the queries containing (M∗0 ,M
∗
1 ) to
the challenger C. After that, C flips a random coin bU←−{0, 1}
and permits the adversary to anonymously interact with M∗b .
For the accomplishment of anonymous access, A2 invokes the
SendM query with intermediate algorithm I as the input to
honestly transfer the communication message between A2 and
M ∗b . After the challenge phase, A3 can continuously interact
with all meters including (M∗0 ,M
∗
1 ) as A1. Next, M∗0 and
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M∗1 call the Execute query to avoid trivial attacks (such as
man-in-the-middle attaks) in the symmetric key based con-
struction, and after that, they send their transcripts (Π0,Π1)
and (Π
′
0,Π
′
1) of the protocol Π to the adversary. Therefore,
the advantage of the adversary in guessing the correct bit can
be defined as follows:
AdvIND∗Π,A (k) :=
∣∣∣Pr[ExpIND∗−0Π,A (k)→1]−Pr[ExpIND∗−1Π,A (k)→1]∣∣∣ .
C. Security Considerations of the Proposed Authentication
Scheme
Now we analyze the security of the proposed authentication
protocol by using the above models.
Theorem 1 (Security). Consider a (d, n, l, λ, 1)-secure
PUF, and let FE be a (d, λ, 2)-secure fuzzy extractor, and h
be a 3-secure pseudorandom function. Then the proposed pro-
tocol is secure against man-in-the-middle attacks with memory
compromise. In particular, we have AdvSecΠ,A ≤ l.n(1 + 2 +
3).
Proof. The objective of adversary A is to violate the
security experiment. In this context, the goal of A is to
convince the smart meter or the service provider to accept
the session without any matching session, especially when the
communication is altered by the adversary. Now the following
game transformations is considered. Let Xi be the advantage
of the adversary at winning the game in Game i.
Game 0. It specifies the original game between the chal-
lenger C and the adversary.
Game 1. C randomly guesses the meter
M∗U←−{M1, · · · ,Mn}. C aborts the game if the adversary has
a different sid∗ and/or the adversary does not impersonate
M∗.
Game 2. Let l be the maximum number of sessions that
the adversary can establish in the game. For 1 ≤ j ≤ l, we
verify or alter the related parameters of the session between
the service provider and M∗ up to the l-th session as per the
following games:
• Game 2 − j − 1. At the j-th session, C evaluates the
output of the PUF implemented in M∗. C aborts the game
if the output does not have enough entropy or if it is
correlated to the other outputs derived from the inputs to
the PUF.
• Game 2− j − 2. The output from the fuzzy extractor
(Ksyn,K) is turned into a random bit string.
• Game 2 − j − 3. In this game the output from the
pseudorandom function (PRF), h(K, ·) and h(sk, ·) is
obtained from a truly random function.
• Game 2−j−4. In this game the resultant output from the
PRF h(Ksyn , ·) is obtained from a truly random function.
• Game 2−j−5. We change the XORed output R∗new =
K⊕R′new and hd∗i = h(sk||Ns)⊕hd to randomly chosen
R∗new , hd
∗U←−{0, 1}|R
∗
new ,hd
∗|.
The main idea of the security proof is to modify the
messages corresponding to the target smart meter M ∗ to
arbitrary strings. The attacker wins the game and breaks the
security of the proposed scheme if he/she can distinguish the
random strings from real messages/outputs and/or convince
the smart meter or service provider to accept the session
while the communication is modified. We proceed with the
game transformation starting with the first call of the smart
meter M ∗. After that, we gradually change the communication
message from Game 2-j-1 to Game 2-j-5. We move to the
next section, once these transformations are finished. Here,
we recursively apply this strategy up to the upper bound l on
the number of sessions that the attacker can establish. Through
these game transformations, we show that the advantage of the
adversary against the authentication protocol can be limited to
negligible values as shown in the results of Lemma 1 through
5.
Lemma 1 (Random Guessing): If there are n smart meters,
then X0 = nX1.
Sub-Proof: We say that the adversary wins the game when
there is a session which the service provider or smart meter
accepts, while communication is modified by the adversary.
Since we assume that there are at most n smart meters,
therefore the probability that the challenger C can correctly
guess the related session is 1/n.
Lemma 2 (PUF Response): X1 = X2−j−1 and
X2−(j−1)−5 = X2−j−1 for any 2 ≤ j ≤ l, if the PUF used
in the smart meters is a (d, n, l, λ, 1)-secure PUF.
Sub-Proof: Since the PUF used in the proposed protocol
is (d, n, l, λ, 1)-secure, it implies that its intra-distance is less
than d, the inter-distance is larger than d, and the min-entropy
of the PUF is lager than λ. Besides, the PUF also has the
desirable property that even if the input to the PUF is exposed,
the output derived from the PUF satisfies the sufficient min-
entropy property and that makes each output uncorrelated.
Here, the challenger does not check the entropy of the output
in this game. Now, consider a scenario where an adversary
issues the reveal query and obtains the stored information from
the PUF’s memory. In this regard, since X1, X2−j−1 and
X2−(j−1)−5 use the (d, n, l, λ, 1)-secure PUF, the distance
between them is bounded by 1. Therefore, we can write
|X1 −X2−j−1| ≤ 1 and
∣∣X2−(j−1)−5 −X2−j−1∣∣ ≤ 1. This
means there is no effect on the game transformation.
Lemma 3 (FE Output): If the FE is a (d, λ, 2)-secure
fuzzy extractor, then X2−j−1 = X2−j−2 for any 1 ≤ j ≤ l.
Sub-Proof: As discussed, the fuzzy extractor is secure if
the min-entropy of the PUF input R in the FE.Gen(R) =
(K, hd), is at least λ and K is statistically 2-close to a
uniformly random variable in {0, 1}k , even if the helper data
hd is disclosed. Now, since the PUF provides enought min-
entropy λ, the property of the (d, λ, 2)-fuzzy extractor ensures
that the output of the fuzzy extractor is close to a random
string. Therefore, no adversary can distinguish the difference
between the games X2−j−1 and X2−j−2 . Therefore, the
advantage of the adversary in distinguishing the two games
can be represented as |X2−j−2 −X2−j−1| ≤ 2.
Lemma 4 (Authentication with Secure PRF): ∀ 1 ≤ j ≤
l, |X2−j−2 −X2−j−3| ≤ AdvPRFh(.),β(k), where AdvPRFh(.),β(k)
denotes the advantage of β to break the security of the PRF
h(·).
Sub-Proof: If there is a difference between these games,
then we can construct an algorithm β which breaks the security
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of the PRF h(·). β sets up all the security credentials and
simulates our protocol except the i-th session. β can access
the real PRF h(K, ·) or a truly random function. When the
adversary invokes the i-th session, β sends {n∗pU←−{0, 1}k}
as the output of the service provider. When A sends n#p to
the service provider, β continues the computations as per the
protocol specifications and issues n#p to the oracle instead of
the normal computation of h(·). Upon receiving V1, β outputs
{R∗new , V1} as the response of the smart meter. When the
adversary sends {R#new , V #1 }, β issues n#p to the oracle and
obtains V1, which is used to authenticate the smart meter.
If β accesses the real PRF, then this simulation is similar
to Game 2 − j − 2. Otherwise, it can be argued that the
oracle query invoked by β is completely random, where the
distribution is equivalent to Game 2 − j − 3. Therefore, we
can write |X2−j−2 −X2−j−3| ≤ AdvPRFh(·),β(k).
Lemma 5 (Secure PRF): ∀ 1 ≤ j ≤ l,
|X2−j−3 −X2−j−4| ≤ AdvPRFh(·),β(k).
Sub-Proof: This lemma can be proved in a way similar to
the proof for Lemma 4.
Lemma 6 (Random String): ∀ 1 ≤ j ≤ l, X2−j−2 =
X2−j−4 = X2−j−5.
Sub-Proof: The fuzzy extractor FE and the PRF h(·) are
already changed to the truly random function in the above
games. Therefore, K and h(K||np) are used as an effective
one-time pad to encode R
′
new and hdnew , respectively. There-
fore, no adversary can differentiate R∗new = K ⊕ R
′
i+1 and
hd∗new = h(K||np)⊕ hdnew from a randomly chosen string.
Theorem 2 (Privacy): Consider a (d, n, l, λ, 1)-secure
physically uncloneable function, and let FE be a (d, λ, 2)
fuzzy extractor, and let h be a 3-secure pseudorandom func-
tion. Then our protocol satisfies the indistinguishability-based
privacy property.
Proof: The proof of this theorem is similar to that for
Theorem 1. In Theorem 1, we have shown that that the
proposed authentication protocol is secure against any forgery
attacks. According to the game transformation described in the
proof of Theorem 1, if we repeatedly modify the messages
communicated for the smart meters M∗0 and M
∗
1 , then the
entire transcript will be identical to random strings. Thus, no
information that identifies the challenger’s coin will be leaked.
Also, all the parameters stored in the smart meter such as
{SIDSMi ,FID, (C,K), (Csyn ,Ksyn)} are randomly generated
and each pair can only be used once. Hence, these parameters
do not provide any information about the smart meter. The
probability that the challenger can identify M∗0 and M
∗
1 so that
the game transformation is finished within a polynomial time
is 1/n2. Therefore, we can argue that our proposed scheme
satisfies indistinguishability-based privacy.
D. Informal Security Analysis
1) Protection Against Impersonation Attacks: In the pro-
posed scheme, if an adversary tries to impersonate as a
legitimate smart meter SMi , then he/she needs to send
a valid authentication request M1 : {SIDSMi , ns} and
a valid response message M3 : {R∗new , V1}. However,
since the PUF and the micro-controller of the smart
Table II
PERFORMANCE COMPARISON BASED ON SECURITY FEATURES
Scheme SP1 SP2 SP3 SP4 SP5 SP6
Wu and Zhou [2] No No No No No No
Xia and Wang [3] No No Yes No No No
Tsai and Lo [5] Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Odelu et al. [6] Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Proposed Scheme Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
SP1: Anonymity of the smart meter; SP2: Privacy against
eavesdropper; SP3: Protection against man-in-the-middle
attacks; SP4: Forward secrecy; SP5: Session key security;
SP6: Physical security of the smart meter
meter are considered to be inseparable [18], the ad-
versary does not have access to the PUF. Therefore,
he/she cannot compute R
′
= PUFSMi (C), K =
FE.Rec(R
′
, hd), np = K ⊕ n∗p, Cnew = h(np||K),
R
′
new = PUFSMi (Cnew ), R
∗
new = K ⊕ R
′
new , and
V1 = h(np||K||R∗new ). As a result, the adversary cannot
create a valid response message M3 : {R∗new , V1}, which
is essential to convince the service provider. On the other
hand, if the adversary tries to impersonate as a legitimate
service provider, then he/she needs to know the secret
K. Without knowing the secret K, the adversary cannot
generate a valid key-hash response V0 = h(ns||K||n∗p)
and V2 = h(hd∗new ||K). In this way, we ensure security
against impersonation attacks.
2) Anonymity of the Smart Meter: In the proposed scheme,
the smart meter needs to use a valid shadow identity
SIDSMi for each session, and a shadow identity SIDSMi
cannot be used twice. Therefore, no one except the
service provider can recognize the activity of a smart
meter. Besides, in case of loss of synchronization, the
smart meter needs to use one of the unused fake iden-
tities fidj from FID = {fid1 , · · · ,fidn}. After that, the
smart meter needs to delete the chosen fidj from its
memory. Therefore, changing the pseudonym in each
session ensures identity intractability. This approach of
the proposed scheme helps to achieve privacy against
eavesdropper (PAE).
3) Protection Against Physical Attacks: Suppose an inside
adversary (e.g. a consumer) intends to perform physical
tampering on the smart meter in order to influence the
consumption reading and thus the electricity bill. How-
ever, any such attempt to tamper with the PUF changes
the behavior of the device and renders the PUF useless.
As a result, the PUF will not be able to produce the
desired output R
′
= PUFSMi (C) during the execution
of the proposed authentication protocol. Therefore, the
service provider can detect such attempts at tampering.
In addition, since PUFs are safe against cloning and a
PUF cannot be recreated [19], the proposed scheme is
secure against cloning attacks.
4) Protection Against Replay Attacks: In the proposed
scheme, an adversary cannot reuse the message M1 :
{SIDSMi , ns} since SIDSMi changes in each session.
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Table III
PERFORMANCE COMPARISON BASED ON COMPUTATION COST
Scheme Smart Meter Service Provider
Wu and Zhou [2] 3Tmp+Tm+Tcertgen+Th 4Tmp+Tm+Tcertver +4Th+Ts
Xia and Wang [3] Ts+ 4Th Ts+ 4th
Tsai and Lo [5] 4Tmp+Te+5Th 3Tmp+Te+ 2Tb+5Th
Odelu et al. [6] 3Tmp+Te+ 6Th 2Tmp+Te+ 2Tb+6Th
Proposed Scheme FE.Rec + 5Th+TPUF FE.Gen + 6Th
Tmp : Execution time of a multiplication point operation; Tm : Execution time of a multiplication operation;
Te : Execution time of a modular exponential operation; Ts : Execution time of a symmetric encryption/decryption;
Tb : Execution time of a bilinear pairing;Th : Execution time of a hash operation;
TPUF : Execution time of a PUF operation;Tcertgen/ver : Execution time of a certificate generation/verification operation
The adversary cannot reuse message M2 since a new
challenge C is used in each session. Similarly, an
adversary also cannot resend the messages M3 and M4
since a new response R
′
new and new helping data hdnew
are used in each session. In this way, we ensure security
against replay attacks.
5) Session Key Security: Only a legitimate smart meter
SMi who knows the helper data hd can derive R
′
=
PUFSMi (C), K = FE.Rec(R
′
, hd), np = K ⊕ n∗p,
and sk = h(np||ns||K). Similarly, only the legitimate
service provider who knows the key element K can
compute the session key sk = h(np||ns||K). Besides,
since the session key is generated based on two random
numbers np and ns, and there is no relationship between
the session keys. Therefore, if one of the session keys
is compromised, it does not help to recover any past or
future session keys. In this way, we provide protection
against known session key attacks.
V. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS AND COMPARISON
In this section we compare the proposed scheme with
other related schemes, such as the schemes of Wu and Zhou
[2], Xia and Wang [3], Tsai and Lo [5], and Odelu et al.
[6]. In order to analyze the performance of the proposed
scheme, particularly on the security front, our scheme has been
compared with [2], [3], [5] and [6], by considering the major
security properties (shown in Table II). From Table II, we
see that the schemes presented in [2] and [3] cannot ensure
most of the important security properties such as anonymity
of the smart meter, privacy against eavesdropper, etc. Even
though Odelu et al.’s scheme can provide several security
properties, like other existing schemes, it cannot ensure the
physical security of the smart meter, which may allow inside
attackers (e.g. home users) to compromise and control the
smart meter for their own profit. On the other hand, the
proposed PUF-based authentication scheme can ensure all the
important security properties (as shown in Table II). Since any
attempt at physical tampering of the smart meter will affect
the PUF’s behavior, the service provider can comprehend such
attacks during the execution of the authentication process.
Next, we compare the proposed scheme in terms of the
computation cost. From Table III, we can see that both
the proposed scheme and the scheme presented in [3] are
Table IV
EXECUTION TIME OF VARIOUS CRYPTOGRAPHIC OPERATIONS
Operation Smart Meter Service Provider
Tmp 5.9 ms 2.6 ms
Tm 22.93 ms 14.5 ms
Tb 9.23 ms 3.78 ms
Tcertgen 57.63 ms -
Tcertver - 17.24 ms
Th 0.026 ms 0.011 ms
Te 7.86 ms 2.34 ms
Ts 0.079 ms 0.041 ms
TPUF 0. 12 ms -
FE.Gen (.) - 1.17 ms
FE.Rec (.) 3.28 ms -
based on symmetric key cryptographic systems. Hence, they
impose lower computational overhead on the smart meter,
as compared to the other schemes. Now, for analyzing the
performance of the proposed scheme with respect to others,
we conducted simulations of the cryptographic operations used
in the proposed scheme and [2], [3], [5] and [6] on an Ubuntu
12.04 virtual machine with an Intel Core i5-4300 dual-core
2.60 GHz CPU (operating as the service provider, as per
the scheme). To simulate a smart meter, we use a single
core 798 MHz CPU and 256 MB of RAM, which is not
very different from a real smart meter [20]. The simulation
uses the JPBC library Pbc-05.14 [ 21], and the JCE library
[22] to evaluate the execution time of different cryptographic
operations used in the proposed scheme and [2], [3], [5], and
[6]. Here, for the TPUF operation we consider the simulation
result of [24] on a 128-bit arbiter PUF circuit on an MSP430
micro-controller machine with 798 MHz CPU. In addition, for
FE.Gen(·) and FE.Rec(·) operations, we adopt the code-offset
mechanism using BCH code [25]. For symmetric-key based
encryption/decryption time Ts , we consider the 256-bit AES-
CBC encryption mode.
Now, from Figure 3, we can see that the total computation
time for [3] is lower than others. However, this scheme cannot
ensure most of the important security features which are
desirable for smart grid security (as shown in Table 2). On
the other hand, the proposed scheme has significantly lower
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Figure 3. Performance comparison based on execution time.
computational cost than [2], [5], and [6]. In addition, the
proposed scheme can ensure all the important security features
(including physical security of the smart meter) and is hence
well suited for secure communication in smart grids.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented a novel privacy-aware authenti-
cated key agreement scheme for secure smart grid communica-
tion. The proposed scheme allows a legitimate smart meter to
anonymously interact with the service provider using a session
key. In this context, we utilized lightweight cryptographic
primitives such as one-way hash functions, physically unclone-
able functions, etc. Unlike existing schemes, the proposed
scheme supports the physical security of the smart meters. We
conducted security and performance analyses to show that the
proposed scheme is secure and has reasonable computational
overhead, and is hence better suited for secure smart grid
communication.
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